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Abstract
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies remains a challeng-
ing issue across disciplines. It is an important subject also in the evolutionary game theory to understand how
cooperation arises. The subject has been extensively studied especially in Prisoners’ dilemma game(PD) but the
emergence of cooperation is also an important subject in public goods game(PGG). In this article, we consider
coevolutionary PGG on complex networks where both the topology of the networks and strategies that players
adopt under the influence of game dynamics varies. Though cooperators can contribute a fixed amount per game
in PGG on networks in the previous studies, the cooperators contribute a fixed amount per member of the group
in PGG of this article. The latter is seemed to be more natural than the former model. These models lead to great
differences in both PGGs. We study what effects on the evolution of player’s strategies, defection and cooperation
and the average payoff does the interaction between the game dynamics and the network topology bring. Moreover
by comparing the models that do not depend on game dynamics to the models without topology changing, we
intend to uncover the effect of the topology chnage and the game dynamics on the promotion of the cooperation.
As result we intend to clear in what situations cooperation strategy is promoted or preserved by investigating them
by making computer simulations. We also investigate the relation between the ratio of the cooperator and the
average payoff over all players. Furthermore we study how do the topology of initial networks have an influence on
the cooperation and the average payoff.
keyword; public goods game, complex networks, evolutionary game, cooperation,
network evolution
1 Introduction
The evolution of cooperation among unrelated individuals in human and animal societies remains a chal-
lenging issue across disciplines. Since the 1990s, it has been an important subject also in the evolutionary
game theory[1] to investigate how cooperation arises. The subject has been extensively studied during
the past thirty years, especially in Prisoners’ dilemma game(PD) and its various modified versions [2]. A
rational player chooses the Nash equilibrium strategy, defection, in the original version of the one-off PD
with two strategies by two players[3]. So it is a long-standing question by what mechanism cooperation,
that is Pareto Optimum, is realized. In the iterated PD, a tendency to choose the Nash equilibrium strat-
egy is relieved under some conditions[4]. There are many circumstantial evidences that the cooperation is
promoted within groups in the evolutionary PD on lattice, which is a sort of spacial games[2],[5].
Corresponding studies for evolutionary games on complex networks[6], which are considered as metaphors
for various relations in the real world, in addition to regular networks such as lattice, have been investigated[7],
[8],[9]. In [10], first the effect of a network topology on the promotion of cooperation has been studied in
games with two players. Moreover it is begun to pay its attention to the relations between the evolution of
cooperation and the network structure in social dilemma games[11][12]. The researches on how does game
dynamics on networks influence the network topology, has been developed[13],[14].
[15],[16] studied the coevolution of iterated games and showed that the heterogeneity of networks[17]
such in the scale free networks[18], the lifetime of links[19], the ratio of the time scale of the structure change
to that of strategy change[20] and so on are of importance for the promotion of cooperation. The interplay
between the network structures and game dynamic with respect to the promotion of the cooperation has
been discussed[21],[22].
In coevolutionary models, the models with topology change independent of strategy have been studied[23],
[24],[25]. There, it was also shown that growing networks with a middle value of a maximum degree
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also leads to heterogeneous networks[26] and promotes cooperation[27]. Moreover the PD on growing
networks[28][29], time-varying networks and other networks [30] for promoting cooperation have been
studied. Recently it is pointed that the evolution of strategies only may not satisfyingly promote coopera-
tive behavior in the evolutionary games. It has been rather recognized that the effect of spatial structure
and heterogeneity in addition to the evolution of strategies is important for cooperation [27],[31],[32]. In
the coevolution in the evolutionary games, another property besides the evolution of strategies may si-
multaneously evolves in general. See an excellent review by [33] for researches about such coevolution.
Furthermore it has been pointed out that the combination of network structure and other factors such
as memory promotes cooperation behavior[34], [35]. However, its assertion are not yet conclusive and
sufficiently general, because the analysis of the interaction between network topology and game dynamics
is rather intricated[36].
On the other hand, the Public Goods Game(PGG) [2],[37],[38] that can be interpreted as n-persons PD
has been considered. Studies for cooperation as have been made in PD game have already begun also in
PGG[39].
There are some studies of PGG on fixed networks[40]. First it has been shown that the social diversity
in networks play a crucial role to promote cooperation by some researchers[41] ,[42],[43]. The effect of
assortativity in scale-free networks on the cooperation has been also explored in [44]. Furthermore the
authors of [44] showed that the clustering of networks has a beneficial effect on the promotion of cooperation
as it favors the formation and the stability of compact cooperative clusters. The impact of degree-correlated
aspiration levels has also been studied in [45], [46].
Especially PGG on complex networks with topology change has been studyed[46],[47],[49],[50],[51].
PGG using the normalized enhancement factor δ on random networks[52] has been studied in [47]. A focal
player compares his/her payoff with the payoff of a player chosen randomly among neighbors and change
the strategy based on Fermi rule where either the focal player experience strategy change with a probability
w or network change is undergone with a probability 1−w. In [48], PGG on Barabasi-Albert network[18]
has been studied. There the network is fixed but a focal player plays PGG with g players, which is a fixed
number, among neighbors of the focal player. In the model, comparing the focal player’s payoff with the
payoff of a player chosen randomly among neighbors, his/har strategy is changed and, the change of the
group structure is based on ”reputation” of players.
In PGG on a lattice [46], players break the adverse social ties bringing the worst productivity, whereas
remain ties with others. After breaking the ties, the player will search for a more beneficial interaction
with another partner among the neighbors of neighbors. There a measure of individual’s inertia to react to
their rational selections both at strategy and topological levels is introduced. The strategy of a node and
the local network structure are updated with probabilities ω and 1 − ω, respectively. Different ω values
separate those so that the two time scales is implemented by asynchronous updating ω. The model in [49]
has explored PGG on Newman-Watts small world network[53]. A characteristic property of their model
is that the change of network topology is undergone based on ”aspiration level”, whereas the strategy is
undergone based on Fermi rule. The model proposed by [50] that introduced ”aspiration” for strategy
change and the change of network topology where an unsatisfied player with negative satisfaction defined
by using the aspiration breaks an edge to random neighbor, changes strategy or add an edge to a random
player. The model is only based on the player’s personal information but doesn’t need to know any
information of the neighbors of the player. All of the works assert that cooperation can be promoted or
maintained within the framework of their models. A fine review including rich references is described in
[54], also [7] and [55].
In this article, we consider an evolutionary PGG on diverse complex networks where the topology of
the networks varies mainly under the influence of game dynamics. There the strategies that players employ
also change under the influence of game dynamics. The proposed models are so simple in the sense where
any stochastic change of strategies and any outside factors such as the aspiration (level), Fermi rule and
reputation are not introduced and furthermore we try not to introduce any factors to promote explicitly C-
strategy like a punishment to the utmost;. We consider some evolutionary strategy models that are thought
to reflect and simplify people’s features in the real world. The models sometimes include a part of futures
of above-mentioned models[47],[48],[46],[49], [50],[51]. Moreover we will compare and study these models
in a lump. The some models reflect game dynamics whereas others do not in the change of strategies and
the network structure. Though diverse complex networks are investigated as initial networks, we mainly
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study how does the interaction between the game dynamics and the network topology change influence
the evolution of player’s strategies, defection and cooperation, and the average payoff over all players.
Investigating them by making computer simulations, we intend to clarify in what situations cooperation
is promoted or preserved. We also intend to investigate the influence of the interaction on the average
payoff over all players. The corresponding studies have been already investigated in [58]. Though these
cooperators can contribute a fixed amount per game in PGG on networks in [58], cooperators contibute a
fixed amount per member of the group in PGG of this article. This is a great difference in both PGGs. The
latter is seemed to be more natural than the former model, because it is assumed that players implicitly
have infinite assets in the former model where a player plays the degree k of the player +1 PGGs. Thus
as k becomes large, the asserts that the player has must becomes large. This assumption is though to be
quite unrealistic. In the meanwhile, the latter means implicitly that players have some finite asserts.
The structure of this article is as follows. In the section 2, we explain the original PGG and the PGG on a
network. After that we introduce PGG on complex network as our models. There we introduce evolutionary
models with diverse tactics including network evolution. The some models reflect game dynamics whereas
others do not. Then the comparison of both type models would uncover the influences of game dynamics
on coopperation or affluence. Even more some models change the network topology every game round
where the network evoluves, whereas others do not. The comparison of both type models would uncover
the influences of topological change of the network on cooperation or affluence. We present the results of
simulations of the poroposed models in the section 3. After performing extensive computer simulations, we
select and present only the most conclusive results in this article. In the last section, we briefly summarize
our main findings.
2 PGG on Network and Models
2.1 PGG
PGG is a game with two strategies that puts into a public pot (C-strategy, cooperators) or not(D-strategy,
defectors) for public benefit. Players secretly choose how many of their private tokens to put into the
public pot. The tokens in this pot are multiplied by a factor r (synergy factor), where r is normally greater
than one and less than the number of players N , and the payoff of this public goods is evenly divided
among all players. So the tokens are kept even in players who do not contribute. The group’s total payoff
is maximized when everyone contributes all of their tokens to the public pool. The Nash equilibrium in
this game, however, is not to contribute by all. Those who contribute below average or nothing are called
”free riders”[38].
When a player plays a game with N − 1 players, we assume that the tokens to put into a public pot
are M > 0. So cooperators gain the following payoff Pc;
Pc =
rmM
N
−M = M(rm
N
− 1) (1)
where m is the number of cooperators and it is assumed all cooperators contribute the same value M . The
payoff Pd gained by defectors who contribute nothing is
Pd = M
rm
N
. (2)
So rational players always choose D-strategy because Pc < Pd. However, all players gain more profit at
large m than at small m in general. The larger the number of cooperators becomes, the larger payoffs
gained by players become. That is a dilemma. This dilemma is analogous to Prisoners’ dilemma where
the Paret optimal is not Nash equilibrium.
2.2 PGG on Networks
We extend the original PGG to PGG on networks in this subsection[41]. For example, let’s consider a
network given in Fig.1, where n players exist on nodes. Players mutually connected by edges mean that
there are some personal relations among them. Nodes connected with a node by edges represent opponents
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who the player on the node plays PGG. In Fig.1, player A plays PGG with players B, C, D and E. This
PGG is called A-chair game, which is played by 5 players. On the other hand, player D plays PGG with
2 players, A and E. So in Fig.1 the player A have to play 5 games, that are B, C, D and E-chair games in
addition to A-chair game. The total payoff of the player A is the sum of the 5 games. In general, every
player i plays ki+1 PGGs, where ki is the degree of node i. Though a player i contribute to a fixed amount
M for all ki + 1 PGGs in the previous article [58], we assume that cooperators contribute a fixed amount
per member of the group including ki + 1 players,
Ci =
M
ki + 1
(3)
in this article. So the payoff acquired by a player i is given by
Pi =
n∑
j=1
Bij
r
∑n
`=1Bj`S`C`
kj + 1
− (ki + 1)SiCi, (4)
where Bij is defined as follows by using the adjacency matrix Aij and the unit matrix I = {Iij}
Bij = Aij + Iij (5)
and
Si =
{
1 (for strategy C)
0 (for strategy D).
2.3 Strategy Models
We propose some models for strategy evolution. They can be broadly classified into the following two
types. One is that a player playing many PGGs generally employs different strategies for each game, which
are represented by a strategy vector and called A-Model. Another is that a player playing many PGGs
employs the same strategy for each game, which is called B-Model.
A-Model: Every player i may play ki+1 games with different strategies. So every player is characterized
by a strategy vector SAi ;
SAi = (s
A
i1, s
A
i2, s
A
i3, · · · , sAin), (6)
where sAij = {0, 1}. sAij = 1 when the player does put a token into a public pot and sAij = 0 when the player
doesn’t. The dimension of the vector SAi is fixed to the number of players, n, so that we keep the dimension
of the strategy vectors for all players at constant value. We have to prepare the strategies even for uncon-
nected players, because the opponents for a player may change moment by moment due to topology change
of the network. The strategy vectors for all players are integrated into a matrix; n×n Strategy Matrix; SA.
B-Model: Every player i plays ki + 1 games with the same strategies, C or D. So the strategies for all
players are integrated into a vector SB ;
SB = (sB1 , s
B
2 , s
B
3 , · · · , sBn ), (7)
where sBi = {0, 1}. sBi = 1 when the player does put a token into a public pot and sBi = 0 when the player
doesn’t.
Initially we take sAi = 1 or s
B
i = 1 with the probability c that is a model parameter and s
A
i = 0 or
sBi = 0 with the probability 1 − c. Some updating models for strategies are obtained for A-model and
B-model, respectively. We introduce two models for tactics to explore the effects of the game dynamics for
A-Model.
A-1 Model is the model that a player i imitates the strategy vector of the player who acquired the
largest payoff among players connected with the player i in the next round. Thus the strategies of players
4
Figure 1: PGB on Network .
are affected by the game dynamics. They are greedy persons.
A-2 Model is the model that a player i increases the ratio of C(D) by t in his/her strategy vector, when
the total number of C(D) strategy in i-th component of the strategy vectors of the players connected with
the player i is bigger than the one of D(C), in the next round. Thus the strategies of players are not
affected by the game dynamics. Then it is expected to obtain the same results as the previous studies [58].
They are opportunism.
Similarly to A-Model, three models for tactics are introduced in B-Model.
B-1 Model is the model that a player i imitates the strategy of the player that acquired the largest payoff
among players connected with the player i in the next round. Thus the strategies of players are affected by
the game dynamics like A-1 Model. Then it is expected to obtain the same results as the previous studies
[58]. They are also greedy persons.
B-2 Model is the model that a player i chooses the strategy of the majority side among the players
connected with the player i, in the next round. Thus the strategies of players are not affected by the game
dynamics like A-2 Model. They are also opportunism.
B-3 Model is the model that a player flips his/her strategy from C(D) to D(C) in the next round, when
the payoff acquired by the player becomes negative. They are persons who hate to admit defeat. Then
the players with D-strategy basically acquire positive payoffs, since they are free riders. So it is considered
that there are the cases that C-strategy change to D-strategy but there are not the opposite pattern. It is
expected that D-strategy increases.
We do not consider any model corresponding to B-3 Model in A-Model, because we think that a person
would not drastically change his(her) strategy such as flipping all the components of a strategy vector in
a practical manner. Such thought has already seen in A-2 Model where the change of the ratio of C or D
strategy in a strategy vector is controlled by a not so large parameter t.
2.4 Topology Change Models
In the early days, a model for Prisoners’ Dilemma on random networks has been proposed where when
the payoff of a focal player increases, the player accepts a randomly chosen new link and when the payoff
decreases, the player cut a randomly chosen link in [60]. The topology change in this model induces C-C
links and suppresses D-D links. Moreover a model that is implicitly based on payoffs, in which a player
who the strategy is mimicked by another player make another different friend has been proposed[27]. It
is also shown that avoiding connections with players with D-strategy often promote cooperation even at
lower r[47]. Furthermore the preferential selection for topology change model has been also explored[61].
The way of the topology change in the article is based on strategy-inspired[62] and includes implicitly
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phycological factor as shown below. We proposed two models for topological evolutions of a network[58].
Topology change of our model is not directly based on increase and decrease of the payoff but is to rupture
a player who is not favored as shown below. This can be thought to be a natural way.
α-Model
A player i cuts the edge with one of players with D strategy, who are harmful to the player i or reduce the
payoff of the player i, with the probability p. The player i sets up a new edge to an unconnected player j
chosen randomly with the probability q[13] inspired the models introduced in [9], [15], [47],[63]. However,
our model is so simple that the time scale, which has been introduced in most of the above studies, with
respect to coevolution is not introduced. We attempt to realize cooperation without the time scale in this
article.
β-Model
A player i cuts an edge with one of players with D strategy, which are harmful to the player i or re-
duce the payoff of the player i, with the probability p. The player i sets up a new edge to an unconnected
player j who is not directly connected but connected in two hops with the player i with the probability q[15].
When a player connect an edge to some new friend introduced by our friends, the concept such the
reputation[64] is not used, since we pursue preferably simple models for cooperation. A property of the
two models for topology change is that players break off their edges with players employing D-strategy
that is unprofitable for the players. This rule for the topology change may create a potential for promoting
cooperation. We study this possibility.
When all edges from a node is broken (it does not mean that the node breaks an edge itself that connects
the node to another node) and the node is isolated, it is impossible that the node is connected with any
nodes again in β model. Thus the number of isolated nodes increase over time. By contrast, a node that
all edges from the node is broken and is isolated may be accidentally connected with some nodes in α
model. So the isolation phenomenon will be relieved. We, actually, study only α model in this article and
will study β model in another time.
We make simulations of these models on the following typical three networks as initial networks to
explore the transition of the average payoff and the number of cooperators, and topological transition,
especially the degree distributions for all models.
1. Random Networks(ER, Erdos-Reny model[52]),
2. Scale Free networks (SF, Barabashi-Albata model[18]) with scaling exponent=3,
3. Small World networks(WS, Wattz-Strogatz models[65] with rewriting ratio w = 0.1 ∼ 0.01),
where w=0.01 ∼ 0.1 is the parameter area where networks show obvious small world properties.
3 Simulation Results
In simulations, we fix t = 0.1 and take n = 200 as the network size. For simplicity, we set M = 1 but
this does not bring crucial effects on the results of this article. @ The average degree k is taken between
4 and 16. k = 4 ∼ 6 is representatives of low degrees and k = 16 is a representative of high degrees
for n = 200. r is taken between 0.5 and 12.0. Though r = 0.5 seems to be trivial since it is expected
that all D-strategy is realize, simulations do not necessarily follow in the intricate setting given in these
coevolutionary models. In this section, varying p, q, r, k and c, we investigate the ratio of D-strategy, the
average payoff over all players and the future of the constructed network topology after topology change,
especially degree distributions. c has only an influence on the final converged value of D-ratio but does
not have any influences on the whole behaviors of the time change of the D-ratio. So we fix c = 0.5.
When 0 < {p, q} < 1, the results are essentially the same as those of p = q = 1, but only the effect
taking 0 < {p, q} < 1 is that convergence becomes slow. So we should study the cases with p = q = 0
and p = q 6= 1 to explore the influence of topology change on the average payoffs and the number of
cooperators. At p = q, the total number of edges is kept nearly constant. These different two values of p
and q must reveal the effects of topology change. The number of repetition is appropriately chosen in the
same parameters by observing how the results converge.
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Figure 2: The D ratio in A1-model (ERnet k = 4) with-
out topology change.
Figure 3: The D ratio in A1-model (WSnet w = 0.01 and
k = 4) without topology change.
Figure 4: The D ratio in A1-model (WSnet w = 0.01 and k = 4)
with topology change.
Figure 5: The D ratio in A1-model (WSnet w = 0.01 and
k = 16) with topology change.
3.1 A models
A-1model: The ratio of C-strategy is almost same as the one of D-strategy in the cases without topology
change, but it is observed that C-strategy outnumber D-strategy a little in WS networks with small k
at large r as shown in Fig.2 and Fig.3.(f1 f2) This property is like the previous model that a player
contributes to a fixed amount [58]. However, the model with topology change on WS networks and ER
networks clearly promotes C-strategy irrespective of r, than the previous model,. Fig.4 and Fig.5 show the
ratio of D-strategy in WS-nets, but the ones in ER-nets are essentially the same as these figures. ( figf3f4)
SF networks do not so, especially at small r which are shown Fig.6 and Fig.7. ( f5f5’) This behavior is
like the cases without topology change and also like the previous model that a player contribute to a fixed
amount [58]. The inhomogeneity of the degree in initial networks is thought to resist the increment of
C-strategy, especially at small r. We should note that the final degree distribution that will be discussed
in the subsection 3.3 are Poisson like degree distribution against the initial one. These results stand in
contrast to the previous model where D-strategy is almost dominant in the case without topology change
and C-strategy is sometimes promoted only at large r in the case with topology change.
It may be suggested that the synergism between the topology change and the game dynamics promotes
C-strategy from all of the results. By studying A-2 model, we think that the effect of topology change
works more intensely than the game dynamics.
Regardless of whether with or without the topology change, the average payoff in WS and ER networks
behaves in the same way as shown in Fig.8 and Fig.9, (f6 f7) where the average payoffs are negative only at
r=0.5. This is a natural result. In SF network, however, the average payoffs are always positive as shown
in Fig.10 and Fig.11. f8f8’ This shows that the average payoff does not become negative even in the cases
where there are a lot of D-strategy.
A-2model: The results are essentially the same as those of the previous models[58]. This is because
A-2 model does not depend on the game dynamics but the studies are refined in this article. While D-
strategy is more or less superior to C-strategy in the cases without topology change at small k, the ratio
of C-strategy depends on r at large k. They are represented in Fig.12-Fig.15. f9f10,(f11,f12). As for the
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Figure 6: The D ratio in A1-model (SFnet k = 16) with topol-
ogy change.
Figure 7: The D ratio in A1-model (SFnet k = 6) with topology
change.
Figure 8: The average payoff in A1-model (WSnet w = 0.01
and k = 4) without topology change.
Figure 9: The average payoff in A1-model (WSnet w = 0.01
and k = 4) with topology change..
Figure 10: The average payoff in A1-model (SFnet k = 16)
with topology change.
Figure 11: The average payoff in A1-model (SFnet k = 6)
without topology change..
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Figure 12: The D ratio in A2-model (WSnet w = 0.1 and k = 4)
without topology change.
Figure 13: The D ratio in A2-model (WSnet w = 0.1 and
k = 16) without topology change.
Figure 14: The D ratio in A2-model (ERnet k = 16) without
topology change.
Figure 15: The D ratio in A2-model (ERnet k = 4) without
topology change.
cases with topology change, C-strategy, however, is remarkably superior to D-strategy at small k which
are shown in Fig.16 and Fig.17. f13f14 This trend is relieved at large k as shown in Fig.18 and Fig.19.
(fig15f16)
The average payoff in all networks is positive except for the case of r=0.5 even in SF networks like
A-1 model. We can see that topology change promotes C-strategy in this model. This model suggests the
possibility that topology change only promotes C-strategy even without game dynamics.
3.2 B models
B-1model: While at small k, C-strategy is excessively promoted at large r in the cases without topology
change, D-strategy mainly is promoted except at large k for large r, similar to the previous models[58].
These are represented in Fig.20 and Fig.23.(fig20-23) This behavior does not depend on the initial networks.
This tendency becomes more notable in the cases with topology change as shown in Fig.24 and Fig.25.
(24,25) C-strategy becomes sometimes predominant over D-strategy at all r for small k as shown Fig.26.
(26) Moreover there are sometimes the situation that D-strategy becomes predominant at all r for large k
Figure 16: The D ratio in A2-model (WSnet w = 0.1 and k = 4)
with topology change.
Figure 17: The D ratio in A2-model (ERnet k = 4) with topol-
ogy change.
9
Figure 18: The D ratio in A2-model (WSnet w = 0.01 and
k = 16) with topology change.
Figure 19: The D ratio in A2-model (ERnet k = 16) with
topology change.
Figure 20: The D ratio in B1-model (WSnet w = 0.01 and
k = 4) without topology change.
Figure 21: The D ratio in B1-model (ERnet k = 4) without
topology change.
as shown Fig.27. (27) This stands in contrast to the previous models[58] where D-strategy often accounts
for 100 percent for all r values at large k. So the power to promote C-strategy is considered to work in the
model in this article.
As for the average payoff, in almost cases, irrespective of with and without topology change, all average
payoffs are positive over all r values as shown Fig.28. f28 The only exception arises in ER networks with
and without topology change at r < 1 for small k which is given in Fig.29. f29 Then players of about
70 percent follow C-strategy in ER networks at r < 1 and k = 4. Some players adopt D-strategy and
they exploit the players employing C-strategy. The average payoff becomes negative due to the players
employing C-strategy of about 70 percent.
As a whole, we can not observe the effect of topology change and so the results mainly depend on the
game dynamics. Generally C-strategy is promoted at large r and small k, and the promotion of C-strategy
proceeds even more than the previous models[58].
B-2model:
The results are essentially the same as those of the previous models[58], since this model does not
Figure 22: The D ratio in B1-model (WSnet w = 0.01 and
k = 16) without topology change.
Figure 23: The D ratio in B1-model (SFnet k = 16) without
topology change.
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Figure 24: The D ratio in B1-model (WSnet w = 0.01 and
k = 4) with topology change.
Figure 25: The D ratio in B1-model (SFnet k = 6) with topol-
ogy change.
Figure 26: The D ratio in B1-model (ERnet k = 4) with topol-
ogy change.
Figure 27: The D ratio in B1-model (WSnet w = 0.01 and
k = 16) with topology change.
Figure 28: The average payoff in B1-model (ERnet k = 16)
with topology change.
Figure 29: The average payoff in B1-model (ERnet k = 4) with
topology change.
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Figure 30: The D ratio in B2-model (WSnet w = 0.1 and k = 4)
with topology change.
Figure 31: The D ratio in B2-model (WSnet w = 0.1 and k = 4)
without topology change.
Figure 32: The D ratio in B2-model (WSnet w = 0.01 and
k = 4) with topology change.
Figure 33: The average payoff in B2-model (WSnet w = 0.01
and k = 4) with topology change.
Figure 34: The D ratio in B3-model (WSnet w = 0.1 and
k = 16) without topology change.
Figure 35: The D ratio in B3-model (ERnet k = 14) without
topology change.
depend on the game dynamics, but the studies are rather refined in this article. Though D-strategy is
superior to C-strategy in many cases without topology change, regardless of topology change or not which
are shown in Fig.30 and Fig.31, (f30 f31) partly there are the cases that C-strategy promotes. A example
is shown in Fig. 32(32) whose behavior is like the previous models[58]. This result presents a contrast
to A2-model independent of game dynamics where topology change has an influence on the promotion of
C-strategy. The manifest effect of topology change is not observed in these models adopting fixed strategy.
So it is considered that some interaction between topology change and strategy change rule takes place.
The behaviors of the average payoff are negative only at r = 0.5 in the all cases. An example of these is
given in Fig.33. (f33)
B-3model: The rate of D-strategy is 100 percent at small r and about 50 percent at large r (r > 1)
in about all cases, regardless of whether with topology change or not. Thus when the synergy parameter
r > 1, that is to say, the total token in a pot are multiplied by a factor bigger than 1, the players employing
C-strategy and the ones employing D-strategy coexist at the almost same rate. They are a series of figure,
Fig.34-Fig.37. ( f34,35,36,37) Otherwise the players adopting D-strategy sweep across the world. This
result presents a contrast to the previous model [58] where C-strategy is promoted when topology change
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Figure 36: The D ratio in B3-model (WSnet w = 0.1 and
k = 16) with topology change.
Figure 37: The average payoff in B3-model (ERSnet w = 0.1
and k = 16) with topology change.
is not considered. But notice that the results in this model are the same as the previous model [58] when
topology change is considered. The average payoff is positive in almost all cases. This is almost the same
as other models and thus it is thought that it does not depend on game dynamics and topology change.
3.3 Degree Distribution
In models with topology change, the final degree distributions are mainly capable of being classified into
four types, as follow. They are P, Q, R and pP and their typical examples are given in Fig.38-Fig.41 where
P type represents Poisson like distribution as shown in Fig.38 where dotted data show Poisson distribution.
pP means the pseud P, looks like P type but a little different from P type. A typical example of pP type
degree distribution is given in Fig.39. Q type distribution where many isolated nodes are observed at r > 1
is given in Fig. 40. R type distribution has a sharp peak in the degree distribution as shown in Fig.41.
An example of the network structure with Q type degree distribution is given in Fig.42 where overlapped
nodes on a straight line in bottom part are all isolated. By more refining the simulations than [58], we
could yield definite results in analysis of this time.
In most of A-1 model, the final degree distribution becomes the P or Q type. The final degree distribution
becomes P type when the average degree k is large and it becomes Q type at small k, except for SF network
with smal k whose final degree distribution is pP type. Edges of many nodes with D-strategy is cut from
other players in Q type. At small k, some nodes are often isolated by being broken as wrong nodes. Once a
node is isolated, the node remains to be isolated until the node is incidentally connected by another node.
About 20 percent of nodes in many cases remains to be isolated in these cases. We can observe it in Fig.40
and Fig.42. However, when the average degree is not so small, since new edges are drawn from nodes
randomly chosen, it is natural that the final degree distribution comes close to Poisson like distribution.
In A-2 model, the final degree distribution becomes the pP or Q type. when the average degree is large,
they are all pP, and they are Q at small k, except for SF net with small k whose final distribution is pP.
Then in SF nets, the final degree distribution becomes all pP type, regardless of the average degree in A-2
model.
In B-1 model, the final degree distributions are all pP type in SF nets and they are all P type in ER
net. They are P type at large k and pP type at small k in WS nets. Thus the final distributions are all
Poison or pseudo Poisson distributions in B-1 model.
B-2 model show most various properties in the final degree distribution. The final degree distributions
become P type except for SF net and WS net with large k. The final degree distribution in SF net with
large k shows an odd property that is a mixture of Q and R. So we call it QR type. They are all P type
in ER nets except A-2 model at large k. In WS nets, though the final degree distribution is P at small k,
it is R type at large k regardless of w, and R type appears only in this case. R type distribution means
that the frequency of rewiring is small or nodes with nearly same number of edges mainly rewire together.
Thus the peculiar types of final distributions appear in B-2 model.
In B-3 model, the final degree distributions become Poisson like distribution in the all cases. In B3 model
it is easy that the flip from C-strategy to D-strategy happens and the edge shot out from the node(player)
of the D-strategy is often broken from other nodes. So it is considered that the random connection to new
nodes leads to Poisson like degree distribution when rewiring often happen in B3 model.
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Figure 38: The final degree distribution in A1-model (WSnet
w = 0.01 and k = 16) with topology change.
Figure 39: The final degree distribution in A3-model (WSnet
w = 0.0 and k = 16) with topology change.
Figure 40: The final degree distribution in A1-model (WSnet
w = 0.1 and k = 4) with topology change.
Figure 41: The final degree distribution in B2-model (WSnet
w = 0.01 and k = 16) with topology change.
Though the degree distributions of initial SF nets, especially at small k, are almost pP type (really an
exception happens only in B-3 model), it is almost P or pP at large k. Thus the final degree distributions
have mostly settled into Poisson like distribution, that is to say P and pP. Q type mainly appears in WS
nets and ER nets with small k
As a whole, P type and pP type distribution are observed in comparatively large number of times which
means that the rewiring rule in the present model, where a new node at rewiring is chosen from random
nodes, has a great influence on the final degree distribution. These results stand in contrast to the models
that a player contribute to a fixed amount, where the final degree distribution were Poisson like in almost
all cases except for Q type which sometimes happend[58].
Figure 42: The network structurein A1-model (ER net k = 4) with topology change.
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3.4 Promotion of C-strategy and Enhancement of Payoff
Though undermentioned all findings in this section were not necessarily shown by the figures in this article,
we summarize the cases in which C strategy is promoted.
(1)The most of A1 models, regardless of r, with topology change, except for SF networks.
(2)The most of A2 models at large r, regardless of considering topology change or not.
Especially, C-strategy is remarkably promoted at all r in A-2 model with topology change.
(3)B1 models with small k at large r, regardless of considering topology change or not.
Contrary to small k, D-strategy is promoted at large k.
Notice that C-strategy is not promoted in the almost cases of B-2 and B-3 models.
The topology change affects the promotion of C strategy in A models to some degree, especially the model
with topology change definitely promotes C strategy in A2 model. Thus the case that a player plays with
different strategies with individual players is rather promoted than with the same strategy in general.
Especially the C-strategy is easier to be promoted in the case that a player strategically accommodates to
his/her friends which link with the player than the case that the player imitates the strategy of the player
that gets the largest payoff in the players connecting to the player.
There is not crucial effects of topology change on promoting C-strategy in B models. Contrary to A-2
model, C-strategy is not promoted B-2 model where players are opportunism. Moreover C-strategy is not
also promoted in the models where players avoid a loss.
On the whole, in the cases with large r and small k C-strategy is more promoted than when it is not so.
It is natural that C-strategy is promoted at large r, because the chance that a player adopting C-strategy
suffers a loss is low. Players that have a little friends have a tendency to adopt C-strategy gradually. The
reason is considered that it is of much benefit when the player that has a little friend breaks the relation
with a player adopting D-strategy.
While C-strategy is not necessarily promoted, there are some cases where C-strategy coexist with D-
strategy in nearly equal proportions. They are
(I) A-1 model without topology change and A-1 model in SF net,
(II)A-2 model at large k for some r,
(III)B-1 model without topology change and with topology change for some r,
(IV)B-3 model for large r,
These cases are significant in the meaning that D-strategy, which is rational from game theoretical point
of view, does not sweep across all players.
The rough summarization in the relation between the promotion of C-strategy and topology change and
game dynamics is as follows. C-strategy is also promoted in some cases in the models which reflect game
dynamics, particularly the cases at small k and large r. C-strategy is more promoted in A1 model with
topology change than that without topology change. Thus the topology change is effective somewhat in
promoting C-strategy but its effect is without much effect. Game dynamics, however, has more effect than
topology change on promoting C strategy in general, as shown the results in A-1 model and B-1 model.
Moreover we could find the synergistic effect in promoting C-strategy in A1 model to some degree. Then
taking things by and large, small k has more potential to promote C-strategy than large k.
As for payoff, it takes the value between 0.0 ∼ 0.5 or 0.0 ∼ 1.0 for r ≥ 1.0 but about −0.4 for r < 1 in
B models. These results do not depend on k, initial networks and whether topology change is considered
or not. The more r is large, the more the average payoff is also large. Of course, it is natural. Most of A
models are in similar results. However, the average payoff takes of 0.0 ∼ tens or 100 in SF nets in A-1
model. It takes of 0.0 ∼ tens in WS nets in A-2 model. It is not clear why such curious behaviors in A
models happens as yet. As a result, we can not observe drastic enhancement in payoffs except for a few
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cases.
4 Summary
In this article, we consider an coevolutionary PGG on diverse complex networks where the topology of
the networks varies mainly under the influence of game dynamics. The diverse tactics are considered to
model simply the actions that usual persons would take. Thus the models presented in this article are so
simple to investigate only the essential skeleton of properties in PGG on networks. Moreover we tried to
make models that do not include any factors which explicitly promotes cooperation in order to study the
effect of only topology change and game dynamics on cooperation , as far as I can do it. Thus we tried to
exclude the factors that cooperation is plainly promoted from model building. The only potential that may
promote cooperation is to break the edges arising from nodes(players) with D-strategy in the presented
models. The some models reflect game dynamics whereas others do not in the change of strategies and the
network structure. Diverse complex networks are investigated as initial networks.
In this research, we studied the ratio of players with D-strategy, the average payoff over all players
and the final degree distributions by simulating coevolutionary PGG, where players have various types of
tactics, on complex networks. We investigated whether the interaction between the game dynamics and
topology change, or a combined effect of them promotes cooperation and make people (players) wealthy
or not.
The similar studies have been already investigated in [58]. Though these cooperators can contribute
a fixed amount per game in PGG on networks, cooperators contribute a fixed amount per member of
the group in PGG of this article. This is a great difference in both PGGs. The model in this article is
considered to be more realistic than the previous model, since it is assumed implicitly that players have
some finite asserts.
As a result, models with game dynamics or some strategy change rules and the models with topology
change promote C-strategy, respectively. However, the game dynamics and the topology change do not
produce a marked synergy effect. An exception that the combined effect somewhat promotes C-strategy
is only A-1 model (and B1-model with small k and large r.) C-strategy, however, rather tends to com-
paratively flourish, especially when k is small than when large k. The reason is that when k is small, the
possibility that is damaged by D-strategy will diminish, because the effect that a player breaks the edge
to a player with D-strategy at small k is more showing up. As for large k, the effect is rather light.
As for the final degree distribution, it depends on the nature of initial networks and sometimes the
average degree. The final degree distribution of the initial SF-net change drastically into Poisson like
(P-like) distribution in most cases. The small k except SF nets leads to Q type distribution but large k
leads to Poisson like ones in A-models. In B-models, the final degree distributions are mainly Poisson like
but sometimes become R or Q type. Poisson-like distributions mean that frequent rewiring happens and
Q-like one show that there are many isolated nodes. R type means that the original degree distribution
does not drastically change in WS-net.
The models considered in this article is so simple and have only some typical properties or a part of
them of usual people. Diverse people, who has more involved characteristics, coexist in the real world. We
should make more realistic models, where players can employ diverse tactics simultaneously, A1, A2, B1
· · · and so on, to reflect such the situation.
The results in this article are preliminary ones, where some models with tactics probable in the world are
considered in a piecewise manner and the simulation size is not so large only to uncover some typical results.
Deeper considerations with more general modeling and large-scale simulations are therefore indicated in
subsequent studies.
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